When I was a kid, we had a saying, though in all honesty, I suppose it was as much of a taunt as a saying … it went like this; “Sticks and stones may break my bones but names can never hurt me!” In short, it meant that if the best argument you could muster up was an ad hominem attack, go back to the playground sandbox where you belong. The only way to resolve differences is to establish common ground, start with that and then proceed until no further compromise is socially acceptable. This method has long been employed in order to develop social standards and norms … the social fabric that allows for and creates those rules by which society has, by and large at least, agreed to live within.
There have been countless examples where, for the most part, these have worked very well. There have also been numerous examples wherein these have been used to institute and legalize egregious oppression. What we are currently seeing, are hitherto unprecedented levels of forced compromise in order to appease the mere fringes. Furthermore, this situation is exacerbated by the ideological beliefs and beliefs in an orthodoxy that sees any slight hint of variation from the religious like and fervent base tenets, being viewed as “violent attacks” that quite literally, merit a violent physical response. Whether the enforced examples of societal norms and abnormalities are excellent examples of a system working well, or an egregious abuse of power, are often only discernible based on the personal ideology or orthodoxy of the individual. What one group may find to be an egregious abuse of power, the “other” side, views as a necessary mandate to generate more equality in results … despite the futility of trying to equalize results in any scenario, much less within a complex societal setting.
Given the fact that these perceptions are rarely all common, they are generally held together and balanced by what is most commonly referred to as the social fabric … that is to say, a certain standard of norms and abnormalities as shall generally be determined by society as a whole. Virtually everyone will freely admit that murder is an antisocial and unacceptable behavior that should be punished. Other acts and actions however, may not be so easily quantified or measured in more traditional terms of good and evil. While these methods will inevitably prevent either side from getting its way completely, (bowing to the ever-popular, though oft illusory (or is that delusional?) left-right paradigm) it does allow for a level of government mandated compromise despite the lack of any consistency or in fact, the lack of any viable rationale or logic.
There is ample evidence that the more distanced the government is from the people governed, the more egregious these policies can become, but that is not the underlying purpose of this article, merely some added food for thought and thought to take into consideration when there is a sufficient amount of time to do so.
The actual point is; once this slippery slope has been approached, where does it bottom out? Where does the path end once the social fabric comes to be treated as a restrictive social construct that somehow or another is perceived to intrude on the freedom of the outermost and extreme fringes of members of said society? What happens to the Social Fabric once it has been rent to the point of being incapable of retaining any societal construct or social cohesion whatsoever?
New “social standards” have indicated some thirty-two different genders despite the scientific realities of limitation to two standard genders, with a very low number of scientific and biological anomalies. Our peace-loving neighbors to the North in Canada, have determined through C16 (A Canadian Law) that the truth and scientific fact are not relevant to “justice”, and that a failure to not only know, but to recognize all of the newly recognized genders, to know all of the relevant and associated pronouns created for and on their behalf, and to somehow or another, be capable of reading minds and knowing which of these many new words must, by law, be used for the specific individual, shall leave a citizen to be subject to being found guilty of a hate crime. Be that as it may, this one is said and done, and the law is in the books and the proverbial cards will now be played and in the end, it will be seen whose hand is a winning hand.
However, consideration should also be given to the path … or the slippery slope as it may be, down which this has already begun to lead the nation … if not much of the world, and the extent to which it will rip the social fabric should it be allowed to extend to its logical conclusions … not that government is often (if ever) burdened by the dictates of logic. Following are some questions that, no answers need be made public, but merely for the sake of introspection and consideration given the direct impact on society and the social fabric which holds our society together … however fragile it may be:
Should exhibitions of fetish behavior such as those who personal proclivities are for Asians, Hispanics, obese people or other fetish behavior, be allowed in public spaces? Should children be solicited to attend these events?
If not, why is a celebration of BDSM allowed in a public venue in San Francisco, where children are allowed, if not actively encouraged to attend, held in a public venue on city streets rather than being restricted to a more private locale?
Should a forty something year old man who now self-identifies as a “six year old girl” so that he can “get away from the realities he used to have to deal with” be allowed to enroll in kindergarten?
If not? Why not? He is either a six year old girl or he is not. If the State (The People) deem him to be a six year old girl in a legal capacity, where do his rights as a six year old girl begin and where do they end? Should his “parents” be charged with Child Neglect or Endangerment for leaving him alone?
Should a grown man who self-identifies as a baby, yet has shown the capacity to dress up in normal clothes, operate a motor vehicle and even build all of his adult-baby furniture, proving his capacity to adequately function in “normal society” be granted disability as this is a “disability”?
If this is a disability; are not, by extension and legal standing, other cases wherein someone identifies as something other than their biological personhood equally disabled? Should his “parents” be charged with Child Neglect or Endangerment for leaving him alone?
Given the recent expansion of this neurotic behavior into the “trans-species” movement, with people most commonly (at present) considering themselves to be dogs, cats, ponies and the occasional reptile, should these people be given a free pass to relieve themselves in public?
If indeed they are “trans-species”, should they not have the natural right to relieve themselves on your yard the same as any neighborhood animal might?
Should prepubescent girls be allowed to dance (fully clothed) in adult strip bars?
If not, why not? If not, why are prepubescent boys being lauded for dressing up in drag and performing in very adult gay venues, where grown men can ogle them? Why is this being celebrated as some type of accomplishment worthy of merit?
Should a child who is incapable of the requisite level of maturity to decide in a reasonable fashion, what to have for dinner, be subjected to a biased trans-gender person speaking for a couple of hours, and then asked to select a gender immediately following such a speech?
If not, why are we allowing for LGBT Story Hour in our schools and public libraries for the students? Mind you, these also do feature sweet sing-alongs featuring such classics as “The hips on the queen go swish swish swish” sung to the tune of Wheels on the Bus … and the children are encouraged to sing (and dance) along with the presenter.
All of these questions revolve around current issues that are ongoing within society today. Are social standards to become totally arbitrary based on the needs of the neurotic behavior of each and every individual within our society? Under such a system, would not practices such as Human Sacrifice and Honor Killings be fully justified? How can one deny the behavior of one while allowing for the behavior of the other? Is society to become selectively hypocritical in enforcement and policy, catering to every cause du jour in the name of “social justice”? At what point do the brakes get applied? At what point does the social fabric begin to tear and society loses any sense of self, and merely becomes a free-for-all where anything goes? We have already mounted the slippery slope, the only thing remaining in question is where we will hit rock bottom and the reaction of society as a whole when we hit.
EXTRA CREDIT: LEGAL DEFINITIONS – JUST FOR FUN AND INFORMATION
Included below are some legal definitions from the Expurgated (Edited) Fourth Edition of Blacks Law. I have tried to include as many as possible, though I do not expect anyone to go through all of them, and no worries, there is no test at the end of the page … but they are very informative … and for better or worse, remain the law and part of the means which will ultimately be put to the test and wherein, when it does all come to a head, those of us who are caught up in the madness, will be tried. Since the APA has now deemed traditional masculinity to be a mental disorder, the neurotic may be in luck, as it looks like the traditional male may very well be the first ones to enter into the courts to be tried by the “new and improved” inclusive system. Inclusion through Segregation. Peace through War. Welcome to the world of the MiniTru.
DELUSION. In medical jurisprudence. An insane delusion is an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the existence of facts which are either impossible absolutely, or, at least, impossible under the circumstances of the individual. It is never the result of reasoning and reflection; it is not generated by them, and it cannot be dispelled by them; and hence it is not to be confounded with an opinion, however fantastic .the latter may be. Guiteau's Case, D.C.D.C., 10 Fed. 161, 170; Davidson v. Piper, 221 Iowa 171, 265 N.W. 107, 109; McKinnon v. State, 51 Ga.App. 549, 181 S.E. 91; Hallucination as a delusion, Petroleum Casualty Co. v. Kincaid, Tex.Civ.App., 93 S.W.2d 499, 501; belief in the impossible, In re Leedom's Estate, 347 Pa. 180, 32 A.2d 3; as respects testamentary capacity, In re McDowell's Estate, 103 N.J.Eq. 346, 143 A. 325, 326.
One based on a false premise, pursued by a logical process of reasoning to an insane conclusion; there being one central delusion around which other aberrations of the mind converge; Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405. See Insanity.
INSANITY. Unsoundness of mind; madness; mental alienation or derangement; a morbid psychic condition resulting from disorder of the brain, whether arising from malformation or defective organization or morbid processes affecting the brain primarily or diseased states of the general system implicating it secondarily, which involves the intellect, the emotions, the will, and the moral sense, or some of these faculties, and which is characterized especially by their non-development, derangement, or perversion, and is manifested, in most forms, by delusions, incapacity to reason or to j udge, or by uncontrollable impulses. In law, such a want of reason, memory, and intelligence as prevents a man from comprehending the nature and consequences of his acts or from distinguishing between right and wrong conduct. Crosswell v. People, 13 Mich. 427, 87 Am.Dec. 774; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 83 Me. 182, 22 A. 107; Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del.Ch. 263.
"Insanity" does not include certain states of transitory mental disorder, such as trances, epilepsy, hysteria, and delirium. Martin v. Fraternal Reserve Life Ass'n, 200 Ill. App. 359, 364, and from both the pathologic and the legal definitions are to be excluded temporary mental aberrations caused by or accompanying alcoholic or other intoxication and the delirium of fever.
The distinction between the medical and the legal idea of insanity has, perhaps, not been better stated than by Ray, who is quoted by Ordronaux, and again by Witthaus & Becker "Insanity in medicine has to do with a prolonged departure of the individual from his natural mental state arising from bodily disease." "Insanity in law covers nothing more than the relation of the person and the particular act which is the subject of judicial investigation. The legal problem must resolve itself into the inquiry, whether there was mental capacity and moral freedom to do or abstain from doing the particular act." 1 Whitth. & Beck.Med.Jur. 181; U. S. v. Faulkner, D.C.Tex., 35 F. 730.
Insanity is a manifestation of disease of the brain, characterized by a general or partial derangement of one or more faculties of the mind, and in which, while consciousness is not abolished, mental freedom is perverted, weakened, or destroyed. Hammond, Nervous System, 332. The prolonged departure, without any adequate cause, from the states of feeling and modes of thinking usual to the individual in health. Bouvier. By insanity is not meant (in law) a total deprivation of reason, but only an inability, from defect of perception, memory, and judgment, to do the act in question, [with an intelligent apprehension of its nature and consequences.] So, by a lucid interval is not meant a perfect restoration to reason, but a restoration so far as to be able, beyond doubt, to comprehend and to do the act with such reason, memory, and judgment as to make it a legal act. Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 263.
Eccentricities and idiosyncrasies, however gross, do not constitute "Insanity." In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah, 207, 167 P. 256, 261. And drunkenness is not insanity, nor does it answer to what is termed an unsound mind, unless the derangement which it causes becomes fixed and continued by the drunkenness 'being habitual, or by chronic alcoholism, and thereby rendering the party incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong, the same as insanity produced by any other cause. Rucker v. State, 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N.E. 802, 805.
Delusion is sometimes loosely used as synonymous with insanity. But this is incorrect. Delusion is not the substance but the evidence of insanity. Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 P. 756, 757, L.R.A. 1917F, 646, Ann.Cas.1917C, 605.
The presence of an insane delusion is a recognized test of insanity in all cases except amentia and imbecility, and where there is no frenzy or raving madness; and in this sense an insane delusion is a fixed belief in the mind of the patient of the existence of a fact which has no objective existence but is purely the figment of his imagination, and which is so extravagant that no sane person would believe it under the circumstances of the case, the belief, nevertheless, being so unchangeable that the patient is incapable of being permanently disabused by argument or proof. Walker v. Struthers, 273 Ill. 387, 112 N.E. 961, 966.
The characteristic which distinguishes an "insane" delusion from other mistaken beliefs is that it is not a product of the reason but of the imagination, that is, not a mistake of fact induced by deception, fraud, insufficient evidence, or erroneous reasoning, but the spontaneous conception of a perverted imagination, having no basis whatever in reason or evidence. Riggs v. Missionary Soc., 35 Hun, N.Y., 658; Buchanan v. Pierie, 205 Pa. 123, 54 Atl. 583, 97 Am.St.Rep. 725.
An "insane delusion" is an idea or belief which springs spontaneously from a diseased or perverted mind without reason or without foundation in fact. It is distinguishable from a belief which is founded upon prejudice or aversion, no matter how unreasonable or unfounded the prejudice or aversion may be, and if it is the product of a reasoning mind, no matter how slight the evidence on which it is based, it cannot be classed as an insane delusion. Coffey v. Miller, 160 Ky. 415, 169 S.W. 852, 854, Ann.Cas.1916C, 30.
As to the distinctions between "Delusion" and "Illusion" and "Hallucination," see those titles.
Derangement. This term includes all forms of mental unsoundness, except of the natural born idiot. Hiett v. Shull, 36 W.Va. 563, 15 S.E. 147. Idiocy is congenital amentia, that is, a want of reason and intelligence existing from birth and due to structural defect or malformation of the brain. It is a congenital obliteration of the chief mental powers, and is defined in law as that condition in which the patient has never had, from his birth, even the least glimmering of reason; for a man is not legally an "idiot" if he can tell his parents, his age, or other like common matters. This is not the condition of a deranged mind, but that of a total absence of mind, so that, while idiocy is generally classed under the general designation of "insanity," it is rather to be regarded as a natural defect than as a disease or as the result of a disease. It differs from "lunacy," because there are no lucid intervals or periods of ordinary intelligence. In re Beaumont, 1 Whart. ( Pa.) 53, 29 Am.Dec. 33; Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill. 502.
Imbecility. A more or less advanced decay and feebleness of the intellectual faculties; that weakness of mind which, without depriving the person entirely of the use of his reason, leaves only the faculty of conceiving the most common and ordinary ideas and such as relate almost always to physical wants and habits. It varies in shades and degrees from merely excessive folly and eccentricity to an almost total vacuity of mind or amentia, and the test of legal capacity, in this condition, is the stage to which the weakness of mind has advanced, as measured by the degree of reason, judgment, and memory remaining. It may proceed from paresis or general paralysis, from senile decay, or from the advanced stages of any of the ordinary forms of insanity; and the term is rather descriptive of the consequences of insanity than of any particular type of the disease. Campbell v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 466, 22 N.E. 620, 6 L.R.A. 167.
Mere imbecility or weakness of mind, however great, is not "insanity." There must be a total want of understanding. Johnson v. Millard, 110 Neb. 830, 195 N.W. 485, 487.
Lunacy. At the common law, was a term used to describe the state of one who, by sickness, grief, or other accident, has wholly lost his memory and understanding. Co. Litt. 246b, 247a; Corn. v. Haskell, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 496. It is distinguished from idiocy, an idiot being one who from his birth has had no memory or understanding, while lunacy implies the possession and subsequent loss of mental powers. Bicknell v. Spear, 77 N.Y.S. 920, 38 Misc. Rep. 389.
On the other hand, lunacy is a total deprivation or suspension of the ordinary powers of the mind, and is to be distinguished from imbecility, where there is a more or less advanced decay and feebleness of the intellectual faculties. In re Vanauken, 10 N.J.Eq. 186, 195; Odell v. Buck, 21 Wend. (N.Y.) 142.
As to all other forms of insanity, lunacy was originally distinguished by the occurrence of lucid intervals, and hence might be described as a periodical or recurrent insanity. In re Anderson, 132 N.C. 243, 43 S.E. 649. But while these distinctions are still observed in some jurisdictions, they are more generally disregarded; so that, at present, in inquisitions of lunacy and other such proceedings, the term "lunacy" has almost everywhere come to be synonymous with "insanity," Smith v. Hickenbottom, 57 Iowa, 733, 11 N.W. 664, 667, and is used as a general description of all forms of derangement or mental unsoundness, this rule being established by statute in many states and by judicial decisions in others, In re Clark, 175 N.Y. 139, 67 N. E. 212.
Cases of arrested mental development would come within the definition of lunacy, that is, where the patient was born with a normal brain, but the cessation of mental growth occurred in infancy or so near it that he never acquired any greater intelligence or discretion than belongs to a normally healthy child. Such a subject might be scientifically denominated an "idiot," but not legally, for in law the latter term is applicable only to congenital amentia. The term "lucid interval" means not an apparent tranquility or seeming repose, or cessation of the violent symptoms of the disorder, or a simple diminution or remission of the disease, but a temporary cure—an intermission so clearly marked that it perfectly resembles a return of health; and it must be such a restoration of the faculties as enables the patient beyond doubt to comprehend the nature of his acts and transact his affairs as usual; and it must be continued for a length of time sufficient to give certainty to the temporary restoration of reason. G odden v. Burke, 35 La.Ann. 160, 173; Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 260.
Non compos mentis. Lat. Not of sound mind. A generic term applicable to all insane persons, of whatsoever specific type the insanity may be and from whatever cause arising, provided there be an entire loss of reason, as distinguished from mere weakness of mind. Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 244. Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 350, 50 Am. Dec. 329.
Forms and Varieties of Insanity
Without attempting a scientific classification of the numerous types and forms of insanity, (as to which it may be said that there is as yet no final agreement among psychologists and alienists either as to analysis or nomenclature,) definitions and explanations will here be appended of the compound and descriptive terms most commonly met with in medical jurisprudence. And, first, as to the origins or causes of the disease:
Congenital insanity is that which exists from the birth of the patient, and is (in law) properly called "idiocy." See supra.
Cretinism is a form of imperfect or arrested mental development, which may amount to idiocy, with physical degeneracy or deformity or lack of development; endemic in Switzerland and some other parts of Europe, but the term is applied to similar states occurring elsewhere.
Folie brightique. A French term sometimes used to designate an access of insanity resulting from nephritis or "Bright's disease." In re Mc-Kean's Will, 66 N.Y.S. 44, 31 Misc. 703. Idiopathic insanity is such as results from a disease of the brain itself, lesions of the cortex, cerebral anemia, etc.
Paranoia. A form of mental distress known as delusionary insanity, and a person afflicted with it has delusions which dominate, but do not destroy, the mental capacity, and, though sane as to other subjects, as to the delusion and its direct consequences the person is insane. Mounger v. Gandy, 110 Miss. 133, 69 So. 817, 818.
It is sometimes characterized as logical perversion, and is said to have "misplaced the antiquated term monomania, which not only implied that the delusion was restricted to one subject, but was otherwise insufficient and misleading." The memory, emotions, judgment, and conceptions are inmost cases unimpaired, though each of these mental divisions may be involved. 2 Clevenger, Med.Jur. 860. It is characterized by systematized delusions, the term taking the place of "monomania" or "partial insanity". Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405.
Polyneuritic insanity. Insanity arising from an inflammation of the nerves, of the kind called "polyneuritis" or "multiple neuritis" because it involves several nerves at the same time. This is often preceded by tuberculosis and almost always by alcoholism, and is characterized specially by delusions and falsification of the memory. It is otherwise called "Korssakoff's disease." (Kraepelin.)
Puerperal insanity. A mental derangement occurring in women at the time of child-birth or immediately after; it is also called "eclampsia parturientium." Syphilitic insanity. A paresis or progressive imbecility resulting from the infection of syphilis. It is sometimes called (as being a sequence or result of that disease) "metasyphilis" or "parasyphilis."
Tabetic dementia. A form of mental derange. ment or insanity complicated with "tabes dorsalis" or locomotor ataxia, which generally precedes, or sometimes follows, the mental attack. As to insanity resulting from cerebral embolism, see Embolism; from epilepsy, see Epilepsy. As to chronic alcoholism as a form of insanity, see Alcoholism.
Traumatic insanity is such as results from a wound or injury, particularly to the head or brain, such as fracture of the skull or concussion of the brain.
General Descriptive and Clinical Terms
Affective insanity. A modern comprehensive term descriptive of all those forms of insanity which affect or relate to the feelings and emotions and hence to the ethical and social relations of the individual.
Circular insanity. Another name for maniacaldepressive insanity, which see.
"Emotional insanity" or mania transitoria applies to the case of one in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties who allows his passions to convert him into a temporary maniac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 583, 21 L.Ed. 236.
In a criminal case the law rejects the doctrine of what is called emotional insanity, which begins on the eve of the criminal act, and leaves off when it is committed. People v. Kernaghan, 72 Cal. 609, 14 P. 566, 568; Graves v. State, 45 N.J.L. (16 Vroom) 347, 350, 46 Am.Rep. 778.
Folie circulaire. The French name for circular insanity or maniacal-depressive insanity.
General paralysis. Dementia paralytica or paresis.
Habitual insanity. Such insanity as is, in its nature, continuous and chronic. Wright v. Market Bank, Tenn.Ch.App., 60 S.W. 623, 624.
Involutional insanity. That which sometimes accompanies the "involution" of the physical structure and physiology of the individual, the reverse of their "evolution," hence practically equivalent to the imbecility of old age or senile dementia.
Katatonia. A form of insanity distinguished by periods of acute mania and melancholia and especially by cataleptic states or conditions; the "insanity of rigidity." (Kahlbaum.) A type of insanity characterized particularly by "stereotypism," an instinctive inclination to purposeless repetition of the same expressions of the will, and "negativism," a senseless resistance against every outward influence. (Kraepelin.)
Legal insanity. Legal insanity is a disorder of the intellect, and is distinguished from "moral insanity," which is a disorder of the feelings and propensities. In re Forman's Will, 54 Barb. 274, 291; Bensberg v. Washington University, 251 Mo. 641, 158 S.W. 330, 336. A disease of the brain, rendering a person incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with respect to the offense charged. State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 S.W. 457, 459.
Maniacal-depressive insanity. A form of insanity characterized by alternating periods of high maniacal excitement and of depressed and stuporous conditions in the nature of or resembling melancholia, often occurring as a series or cycle of isolated attacks, with more or less complete restoration to health in the intervals. (Kraepelin.) This is otherwise called "circular insanity" or "circular stupor."
Moral insanity. A morbid perversion of the feelings, affections, or propensities, but without any illusions or derangement of the intellectual faculties; irresistible impulse or an incapacity to resist the prompting of the passions, though accompanied by the power of discerning the moral or immoral character of the act. Moral insanity is not admitted as a bar to civil or criminal responsibility for the patient's acts, unless there is also shown to be intellectual disturbance, as manifested by insane delusions or the other recognized criteria of legal insanity. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405, 412; Bensberg v. Washington University, 251 Mo. 641, 158 S.W. 330, 336.
In a very few of the states where moral insanity is recognized as a defense, it means an incapacity of resistance, as where there was an entire destruction of the freedom of the will, although the person perceived the moral or immoral character of the act. State v. Leehman, 2 S.D. 171, 49 N.W. 3, 5.
Partial insanity, as a legal term, may mean either monomania (see infra) or an intermediate stage in the development of mental derangement. In the former sense, it does not relieve the patient from responsibility for his acts, except where instigated directly by his particular delusion or obsession: Trich v. Trich, 165 Pa. 586, 30 A. 1053. In the latter sense, it denotes a clouding or weakening of the mind, not inconsistent with some measure of memory, reason, and judgment. But the term, in this sense, does not convey any very definite meaning, since it may range from mere feeble-mindedness to almost the last stages of imbecility. Appeal of Dunham, 27 Conn. 205; State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 383, 9 Am.Rep. 242.
Psychoneurosis. Mental disease without recognizable anatomical lesion, and without evidence and history of preceding chronic mental degeneration. Under this head come melancholia, mania, primary acute dementia, and mania hallucinatoria. Cent. Dict.
"Neurosis," in its broadest sense, may include any disease or disorder of the mind, and hence all the forms of insanity proper. But the term "psychoneurosis" is now employed by Freud and other European specialists to describe that class of exaggerated individual peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of thought towards special objects or topics which are absent from the perfectly normal mind, and which yet have so little influence upon the patient's conduct or his general modes of thought that they cannot properly be described as "insanity" or as any form of "mania," especially because ordinarily unaccompanied by any kind of delusions. At most, they lie on the debatable border-land between sanity and insanity. These idiosyncrasies or obsessions may arise from superstition, from a real incident in the patient's past history upon which he has brooded until it has assumed an unreal importance or significance, or from general neurasthenic conditions. Such, for example, are a terrified shrinking from certain kinds of ani als, unreasonable dread of being shut up in some enclosed place or of being alone in a crowd, excessive fear of being poistoned, groundless conviction of irredeemable sinfulness, and countless other prepossessions, which may range from mere weak-minded superstition to actual monomania.
Recurrent insanity. Insanity which returns from time to time, hence equivalent to "lunacy" (see supra) in its common-law sense, as a mental disorder broken by lucid intervals. There is no presumption that fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are continuous. Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 3 S.W. 538, 58 Am.Rep. 638.
Settled insanity. The term applied to delirium tremens, which is a kind of insanity produced by alcoholism, caused by the breaking down of the person's system by long-continued or habitual drunkenness, and brought on by abstinence from drink. It is thus termed, to distinguish it from. "temporary insanity," or drunkenness directly resulting from drink. Evers v. State, 31 Tex.Cr. R. 318, 20 S.W. 744, 748, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am.St. Rep. 811.
Temporary delusion. The word implies unsoundness or derangement of mind or intellect, not a mere temporary or slight delusion, which might be occasioned by fever or accident. Karow v. New York Continental Ins. Co., 57 Wis. 56, 15 N.W. 27, 31, 46 Am.Rep. 17.
Other Forms of Insanity
Amentia, dementia, and mania. The classification of insanity into these three types or forms, though once common, has of late given way to a more scientific nomenclature, based chiefly on the origin or cause of the disease in the particular patient and its clinical history. These terms, however, are still occasionally encountered in medical jurisprudence, and the names of some of their subdivisions are in constant use.
Amentia. A total lack of intelligence, reason, or mental capacity. Sometimes so used as to cover imbecility or dotage, or even as applicable to all forms of insanity; but properly restricted to a lack of mental capacity due to original defective organization of the brain (idiocy) or arrested cerebral development, as distinguished from the degeneration of intellectual faculties which once were normal.
Dementia. A form of insanity resulting from degeneration or disorder of the brain (idiopathic or traumatic, but not congenital) and characterized by general mental weakness and decrepitude, forgetfulness, loss of coherence, and total inability to reason, but not accompanied by delusions or uncontrollable impulses. Dennett v. Dennett, 44 N.H. 531, 84 Am.Dec. 97; People v. Lake, 2 Parker, Cr.R. ( N.Y.) 218; Graham v. Deuterman, 91 N.E. 61, 62, 244 Ill. 124; Hibbard v. Baker, 104 N.W. 399, 400, 141 Mich. 124.
Among the sub-divisions of dementia should be noticed the following:
Acute primary dementia is a form of temporary dementia, though often extreme in its intensity, and occurring in young people or adolescents, accompanied by general physical debility or exhaustion and induced by conditions likely to produce that state, as malnutrition, overwork, dissipation, or too rapid growth.
Dementia paralytica is a progressive form of insanity, beginning with slight degeneration of the physical, intellectual, and moral powers, and leading to complete loss of mentality, or imbecility, with general paralysis. Also called paresis, paretic dementia, or cirrhosis of the brain, or (popularly) "softening of the brain."
Dementia prcecox. A term applicable either to the early stages of dementia or to the dementia of adolescence, but more commonly applied to the latter. It is often (but not invariably) attributable to onanism or self-abuse, and is characterized by mental and moral stupidity, absence of any strong feeling of the impressions of life or interest in its events, blunting or obscuration of the moral sense, weakness of judgment, flightiness of thought, senseless laughter without mirth, automatic obedience, and apathetic despondency. (Kraepelin.)
Senile dementia. Dementia occurring in persons of advanced age, and characterized by slowness and weakness of the mental processes and general physical degeneration, verging on or passing into imbecility, indicating the breaking down of the mental powers in advance of bodily decay. Hiett v. Shull, 36 W.Va. 563, 15 S.E. 146. Toxic dementia. Weakness of mind or feeble cerebral activity, approaching imbecility, resulting from continued administration or use of slow poisons or of the mere active poisons in repeated small doses, as in cases of lead poisoning and in some cases of addiction to such drugs as opium or alcohol.
Dementia praecox paranoid. A medical term indicating that form of dementia in which the patient exhibits ideas of persecution and has delusions. Rasmussen v. George Benz & Sons, 168 - Minn. 319, 210 N.W. 75, 76.
Erotomania. A form of mania similar to nymphomania, except that the present term is applied to patients of both sexes, and that (according to some authorities) it is applicable to all cases of excessive sexual craving irrespective of origin; while nymphomania is restricted to cases where the disease is caused by a local disorder of the sexual organs reacting on the brain. In erotomania, there is often an absence of any lesion of the intellectual powers. Krafft-Ebing, Psycopathia Sexualis, Chaddock's ed. And it is to be observed that the term "erotomania" is now often used, especially by French writers, to describe a morbid propensity for "falling in love" or an exaggerated and excited condition of amativeness or love-sickness, which may affect the general physical health, but is not necessarily correlated with any sexual craving, and which, though it may unnaturally color the imagination and distort the subject's view of life and affairs, does not at all amount to insanity, and should not be so considered whe n it leads to crimes of violence, as in the common case of a rejected lover who kills his mistress.
Fit of mania. A fit of mania includes a temporary depression or aberration of the mind, which sometimes accompanies or follows intoxication, and is often accompanied by delusions, hallucinations, and illusions. Gunter v. State, 3 So. 600, 607, 83 Ala. 96.
Homicidal mania. A form of mania in which the morbid state of the mind manifests itself in an irresistible inclination or impulse to commit homicide, prompted usually by an insane delusion either as to the necessity- of self-defense or the avenging of injuries, or as to the patient being the appointed instrument of a superhuman justice. Com. v. Sayre, 5 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 425.
Hypomania. A mild or slightly developed form or type of mania.
Mania transitoria. The term applies to the case of one in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, who allows his passions to convert him into a temporary maniac. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 580, 583, 21 L.Ed. 236.
Megalomania. The so-called "delirium of grandeur" or "folie de grandeur;" a form of mania in which the besetting delusion of the patient is that he is some person of great celebrity or exalted rank, historical or contemporary.
Melancholia. A form of insanity the characteristics of which are extreme mental depression, with delusions and hallucinations, the latter relating especially to the financial or social position of the patient or to impending or threatened dangers to his person, property, or reputation, or issuing in distorted conceptions of his relations to society or his family or of his rights and duties in general. State v. Reidell, 9 Houst., Del., 470, 14 A. 551; People v. Krist, 168 N.Y. 19, 60 N.E. 1057.
Hypochondria or hypochondriasis. A form of melancholia in which the patient has exaggerated or causeless fears concerning his health or suffers from imaginary disease.
Monomania. A perversion of the understanding in regard to a single object or a small number of objects, with the predominance of mental excitement, as distinguished from "mania," which means a condition in which the perversion of the understanding embraces all kinds of objects, and is accompanied with general mental excitement. State v. John, 30 N.C. 330, 337, 49 Am.Dec. 396; Freed v. Brown, 55 Ind. 310, 317; People v. Lake, 2 Parker, Cr.R. (N.Y.) 215, 218. A perversion or derangement of the reason or understanding with reference to a single subject or small class of subjects, with considerable mental excitement and delusions, while, as to all matters outside the range of the peculiar infirmity, the intellectual faculties remain unimpaired and function normally. Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 390, 83 Am.Dec. 231; Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S.E. 306, 307.
Oikei mania. A form of insanity manifesting itself in a morbid state of the domestic affections, as an unreasonable dislike of wife or child without cause or provocation. Ekin v. McCracken, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 540.
Paranoia. Monomania in general, or the obsession of a delusion or system of delusions which dominate without destroying the mental capacity, leaving the patient sane as to all matters outside their particular range, though subject to perverted ideas, false beliefs, and uncontrollable impulses within that range; and particularly, the form of monomania where the delusion is as to wrongs, injuries, or persecution inflicted upon the patient and his consequently justifiable resentment or revenge. Winters v. State, 61 N.J.L. 613, 41 Atl. 220; People v. Braun, 158 N.Y. 558, 53 N.E. 529.
Paranoia is called by Kraepelin "progressive systematized insanity," because the delusions of being wronged or of persecution and of excessive selfesteem develop quite slowly, without independent disturbances of emotional life or of the will becoming prominent, and because there occurs regularly a mental working up of the delusion to form a delusionary view of the world, in fact, a system, leading to a derangement of the stand-point which the patient takes up towards the events of life.
INSANUS EST QUI, ABJECTA RATIONE, OMNIA CUM IMPETU ET FURORE FACIT. He is insane who, reason being thrown away, does everything with violence and rage. 4 Coke, 128.
ILLUSION. In medical jurisprudence. An image or impression in the mind, excited by some external object addressing itself to one or more of the senses, but which, instead of corresponding with the reality, is perverted, distorted, or wholly mistaken, the error being attributable to the imagination of the observer, not to any defect in the organs of sense. See Hallucination, and see "Delusion," under Insanity.
ILLUSORY. Deceiving by false appearances; nominal, as distinguished from substantial; fallacious; illusive. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381, 390.